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APPLICATION OF THE HEARSAY EXCEPTIONS AND
CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO THE ADMISSION
OF A CHILD'S OUT-OF-COURT STATEMENTS IN
THE PROSECUTION OF CHILD SEXUAL
ABUSE CASES IN NORTH DAKOTA
ANNA FRSSELL* AND JAMES

M.

VUKELIC**

There has been a startling increase in the reported incidence
of child sexual abuse.' This increased incidence rate and the resultant heightened public awareness have led to a proliferation of
statutory and rule changes aimed at minimizing the trauma for
child victims of sexual abuse often associated with the criminal justice system.2
* Anna M. Frissell, J.D. University of North Dakota School of Law, 1985. Presently
employed as Assistant Attorney General for the State of North Dakota.
*0 James M. Vukelic earned a B.S. in Education in 1971 and a M.S. (counseling and
guidance) in 1973, and J.D. in 1978, all from the University of North Dakota, Grand Forks,
ND. He is currently deputy attorney general for the state of North Dakota.
1. The American Humane Association's national study of child-protection statistics
showed a 200% increase in the reporting of sexual abuse incidents from 1976 through 1983.
Note, A Comprehensive Approach to Child Hearsay Statements in Sex Abuse Cases, 83
COLUM. L. REv. 1745, 1745 n.1 (1983)Xhereinafter A Comprehensive Approach]. In 1976
there were only 6,000 confirmed reports of child sexual abuse. Children's Veracity CrossExamined, Insight On the News, at 50 (Feb. 26, 1990)hereinafter Children's Veracity
Cross-Examined]. By 1980 there were 25,000 reported cases of child sexual abuse per year.
A Comprehensive Approach, supra at 1745 n.1. In 1986, the last year for which the
American Humane Association has figures available, 315,000 incidents of molestation were
reported, out of a total 2.1 million abuse reports of all kinds, and 132,000 proved "wellfounded" after investigation. Children's Veracity Cross-Examined,supra, at 50.
2. Provisions Allowing for Use of One-Way Closed-Circuit Television, One-Way
Screens, or One-Way Mirrors: ALA. CODE § 15-25-3 (Supp. 1988); ALASKA STAT.
§ 12.45.046 (Supp. 1988); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. 1 13-4253 (Supp. 1988); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 54-86g (West Supp. 1989); FLA. STAT. § 92.54 (West Supp. 1989); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
38,
106A-3 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1989); INn. CODE ANN. § 35-37-4-8 (Burns Supp. 1989);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 910A.14 (West Supp. 1989); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3434 (1988); Ky.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 421.350 (Baldwin Supp. 1989); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:283 (West
Supp. 1989); MD. Crs. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 9-102 (Supp. 1988); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 278, § 16D (West Supp. 1989); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.02 (West 1988); N.J. STAT.
ANN.§ 2A:84A-32.4 (West Supp. 1989); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 753 (West Supp. 1989);
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 5985 (Purdon Supp. 1989); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-37-13.1
(Supp. 1988); TEX. CRIM. PRoc. CODE ANN. art. 38.071 (Vernon Supp. 1989); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 77-35-15.5 (Supp. 1989); and VT. R. EVID. 807.
Provisions Allowing for Use of Two-Way Closed-Circuit Television: CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 1347 (West Supp. 1989); HAW. R. EvID. 616; N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAW §§ 65.20 (McKinney
Supp. 1989); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.41 (Page 1987); and VT. R. EviD. 807.
Provisions Allowing for Preservation of Testimony on Videotape: ALA. CODE § 15-25-2
(Supp. 1988); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4253 (1985); ARK. CODE ANN.§ 16-44-203 (1987);
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1346 (West Supp. 1989); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-413 (1986); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-86g (West Supp. 1989); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 3511 (1987); FLA.
STAT. § 92.53 (West Supp. 1989); HAW. R. EViD. 616; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38,
106A-2
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1989); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-37-4-8 (Burns Supp. 1989); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 910A.14 (West Supp. 1989); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3434 (1988); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 421.350 (Baldwin Supp. 1989); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 278, § 16D (West Supp. 1989);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.02 (West 1988); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 491.680-.687 (Vernon Supp.
1989); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 46-15-401 to -403 (1987); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 174.227 &
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In North Dakota some provisions have been made to accommodate the special needs of child victims and witnesses of crime.'
The most recent innovation is an amendment to the hearsay
exceptions to include a special exception for a child's statement
about sexual abuse.4
Coinciding historically with the genesis of these protective
measures are events that may place their future in jeopardy. In
5
1988, the United States Supreme Court decided Coy v. Iowa,
striking down a statute that excused a child victim from viewing
her attacker while testifying, and holding that the sixth amendment requires an unobstructed visual encounter between accuser
and accused.' The Coy decision left many questions unanswered,
not the least of which is the constitutionality of the numerous statutes and rules promulgated to ease courtroom trauma for child
victims. Perhaps partly in recognition of the confusion caused by
Coy, on January 16, 1990, the Supreme Court accepted certiorari
on two cases that promised to further clarify the constitutionality
of these protective provisions.7
Another event impacting public opinion and the prosecution
of child sexual abuse cases is the costly and unsatisfying result8 of
174.229 (Michie 1986); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 517:13-a (Supp. 1988); N.M. STAT. ANN.
4 30-9-17 (1984); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2907.41 (Page 1987); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22,
4 753 (West Supp. 1989); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 5984 (Purdon Supp. 1989); R.I.
GEN. LAws 4 11-37-13.1 (Supp. 1988); S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 23A-12-9 (1988); TENN.
CODE ANN. 4 24-7-116 (Supp. 1988); TEX. CalM. PROC. CODE ANN. art. 38.071 (Vernon
Supp. 1989); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-35-15.5 (Supp. 1989); VT. R. EviD. 807; and Wis. STAT.
§ 967.04(7) (Supp. 1988). The terms "sexual abuse" and "sexual assault" are commonly
interchanged. This article will use whichever term is appropriate. Although both terms are
used throughout this article, the North Dakota criminal statutes most often invoked for the
prosecution of child sexual assault are gross sexual imposition, sexual imposition, and sexual
assault. See N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12.1-20-03, 12.1-20-04 and 12.1-20-07 (1987 & Supp.
1989Xstatutes which uniformly use the term "sexual assault").
3. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 12.1-34 (1987 & Supp. 1989) (sets forth the minimum
statutory requirements for the fair treatment of victims and witnesses of crime); N.D. CENT.
CODE ch. 12.1-35 (Supp. 1989(citing Section 1 of chapter 175, S.L 1 (1987)Xwherein the
North Dakota legislature has explicitly stated that child victims and witnesses deserve
special considerations: "The legislature finds that it is necessary to provide child victims
and witnesses with additional consideration and fair treatment than that usually afforded to
adults. The legislature intends, in this Act, to provide these children with additional rights
and protections during their involvement with the criminal justice system.")
4. See infra notes 183-87 and accompanying text (a child's statement about sexual
abuse is admissible as evidence if it meets certain criteria).
5. 487 U.S. 1012 (1988).
6. Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1015 (1988).
7. Maryland v. Craig, 316 Md. 551,560 A.2d 1120 (1989), No. 89-478, cert. granted, 110
S. Ct. 834 (U.S. Jan. 16, 1990XNo. 89-478), vacated 110 S. Ct. 3157; Idaho v. Wright, 116
Idaho 382, 775 P.2d 1224 (1989), No. 89-260, cert. granted, 110 S. Ct. 833 (U.S. Jan. 16,
1990XNo. 89-260), aff'd, 110 S. Ct. 3139.
8. The McMartin Nightmare: After the Verdict Solace for None, People Weekly 68-80
(Feb. 5, 1990) (evidencing the heightened public interest in this case is the fact that this
popular publication dedicated a "cover story" to the result and noted that the McMartin
verdict left no one satisfied: jurors admitted they believed that molestation had occurred
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the McMartin Preschool case in California.9 Despite 124 witnesses
and 974 major exhibits filling nearly 64,000 pages of transcript
over thirty-three months of trial, at a cost of thirteen million dollars, allegations were leveled that the prosecution was ill-prepared
and that the truth was never reached.' 0
The verdict in McMartin has generated much comment on
the prosecution of child sexual abuse cases. Positive lessons will be
gleaned from post-verdict reflection on the handling of the
McMartin case. Undoubtedly, this reflection will culminate in further systemic changes."
This article will offer an overview of the hearsay exceptions
most commonly invoked in the prosecution of child sexual abuse
cases in North Dakota.' 2 This article will also discuss the sixth
amendment confrontation clause challenges that must be considered to meet the potential constitutional barriers to the admission
of a child's out-of-court statement.
I. THE DEFENDANT'S RIGHT- THE CONFRONTATION
CLAUSE
The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution provides that "...in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right.., to be confronted with the witnesses against him. 13
The rights guaranteed by the sixth amendment confrontation
clause extend to proceedings in the state courts by way of the four4
teenth amendment.1

but felt that the prosecution had failed to prove where, when, and by whom; victims spent
the majority of their adolescence as witnesses in criminal action, only to feel angry with the
result; scholars speculate that the truth was never reached; parents are disconsolate and
angry; the prosecutor was frustrated with the "excruciatingly long" legal process, and; the
defendants suffered lengthy incarceration and financial ruin.)
9. McMartin Preschool'sLessons; Abuse Case Plagued by Botched Investigation, Too
Many Counts, A.B.A.J. 28-29 (Apr. 1990). On January 18, 1990, Raymond Buckey and his
mother, Peggy McMartin Buckey, were acquitted of several charges of child sexual abuse.

Id.
10. Id.
11. See Children's Veracity Cross-Examined, supra note 1, at 50. "The lengthy
McMartin proceedings and others have spurred a movement to amend the California
Constitution... overturn seven different Bird court rulings favoring defendants in criminal
cases and [provide for] other provisions aimed at speeding up proceedings and expanding
the death penalty." Id.
12. See infra notes 143-71 and accompanying text.
13. U.S. CONST. amend VI. Section 29-01-06(3) of the North Dakota Century Code
provides: "In all criminal prosecutions the party accused shall have the right ... to meet
the witnesses against him face to face." N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-01-06(3) (1987 & Supp.
1989). Interpretation of the North Dakota statutory provision probably does not vary from
that of the sixth amendment by virtue of the added language, "face to face." See 5
WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 1397, at 155-58 n.1 (Chadbourn rev. ed. 1974).
14. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403-05 (1965). U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1
provides:
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Most litigation does not pose a confrontation question because
witnesses are generally available to testify in the presence of the
defendant and before the fact-finder.1 5 Likewise, the defendant's
right to confrontation is not always offended where there is not a
face-to-face confrontation between the accuser and the accused. 16
The cross-examiner may attempt to discredit the witness by
challenging the witness' perceptions, ability to recall and articulate recollections, veracity and character. 17 Any infringement,
whether by law or by trial court ruling, on the defendant's right to
conduct a thorough cross-examination of the witness is a potential
violation of the confrontation clause. 18
The United States Supreme Court has noted that an analysis of
the language of the confrontation clause leads to three major categories of potential litigation.'" First, there will be questions as to
the right explicit in the language of the confrontation clause, the
right physically to face those who testify against the defendant.2 °
Second, the clause poses questions as to the appropriateness of a
restriction on the scope of cross-examination. 2 1 Third, questions
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to
the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein
they reside. No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Id.

15. See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 162 (1970Xif declarant is present to testify
and to submit to cross-examination there is no confrontation violation); Cogburn v. State,
292 Ark. 564, _, 732 S.W.2d 807, 811 (1987Xcourt upheld the constitutionality of a child
hearsay statute and denied defendant's challenge because the seven-year-old child witness
was present at trial and subject to cross-examination).
16. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63 (1980). "If one were to read this language [the
confrontation clause] literally, it would require, on objection, the exclusion of any statement
made by a declarant not present at trial.... But thus applied, the Clause would abrogate
virtually every hearsay exception, a result long rejected as unintended and too extreme."
Id. at 63. See also Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1024 (1988) (O'Connor, J., concurringXciting
Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295 (1973)) ("Of course, the right to confront.. is
not absolute and may, in appropriate cases, bow to accommodate other legitimate interests
in the criminal process"). See also Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 347 (1970Xdefendant's
misconduct constituted a forfeiture of the right to be present at trial); Barber v. Page, 390
U.S. 719, 725 (1968Xintentional waiver of constitutional right to confront witnesses is
permissible); State v. Black, 291 N.W.2d 208, 214 (Minn. 198OXwitness intimidated into
silence by defendant found to have caused defendant to forfeit right of confrontation); State
v. Garvey, 283 N.W.2d 153, 156 (N.D. 1979Xpermitted admission at trial of officer's
preliminary hearing testimony, pursuant to Rule 804(bXl) of the North Dakota Rules of
Evidence, over the defendant's objection that there was less incentive to conduct adequate
cross-examination at a preliminary hearing). But see State v. Campbell, 299 Or. 633, _, 705
P.2d 694, 705-06 (1985Xen bancXprosecution and defense cannot stipulate to incompetence
of a three-year-old witness so as to render the child unavailable as a witness).
17. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316 (1974).
18. Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 51 (1987).
19. Coy, 487 U.S. at 1016.
20. Id. at 1017 (citing Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 53 (1987)).
21. See generally Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1016-18 (1988).
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arise as to the admissibility of out-of-court statements.2 This
breakdown into categories of litigation is deceptively simple
because even though the analysis of each category is separate and
distinct,2 3 many confrontation cases do not fall neatly into the categories. For instance, the Supreme Court has addressed confrontation clause questions in conjunction with the defendant's right to
be present at trial, -4 the right to have the jury observe the
demeanor of the witnesses,25 and the right to be present at pretrial hearings.2 6
The right to face-to-face confrontation with a witness at trial is
explicit in the confrontation clause: "... the accused shall enjoy
27
the right ...to be confronted with the witnesses against him."
Recently, the United States Supreme Court acknowledged the historical significance of the literal right to face-to-face confrontation
guaranteed by the sixth amendment.28 In its decision, the Court
analyzed the historical perspective, traveling through time from
the Roman tribunals to the American wild west, and noted that
societies have viewed justice as being best served when the
accused is confronted by the accuser.2 9 The Court further noted
that the legal significance of embracing societies' "vision" of justice has been to establish a criminal system wherein societies' perception, as well as the reality of fairness, prevail.30
The right to cross-examine is implicit in the confrontation
clause. 3 1 "[T]he opportunity for cross-examination, protected by
the Confrontation Clause, is critical for ensuring the integrity of
the fact-finding process. "32 Cross-examination is "the principal
means by which the believability of a witness and the truth of his
testimony are tested."33
When presented with an out-of-court statement the confrontation clause demands inquiry as to the statement's reliability or
trustworthiness.34 The United States Supreme Court has stated
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Id. at 1016 (citing Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980)).
Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 18 (1985).
Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 95 (1970XHarlan, J., concurring).
Roberts, 448 U.S. at 64 n.6 (1980).
See, e.g., Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730 (1987); Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308

(1969).
27. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 62-63.

28. Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1015-18 (1988).
29.
persists
30.
31.
32.

Id. The Supreme Court noted that the phrase, "Look me in the eye and say that,"
in usage today. Id. at 1018.
Id. at 1018-19 (quotin'g Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 540 (1986)).
Coy, 487 U.S. at 1020.
Stincer, 482 U.S. at 736.

33. Id. at 736 (citing Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316 (1974)).
34. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66.
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that, for confrontation clause purposes, the reliability of a statement may be inferred when the statement falls within a "firmly
rooted hearsay exception" or "has particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness."

35

II. CONFRONTATION CLAUSE CASES
The United States Supreme Court has a long history of analyzing the confrontation clause. In 1895, the landmark case of Mattox
v. United States36 held that some forms of hearsay are admissible
despite lack of confrontation. 31 In Mattox, two of the state's witnesses died before trial; the trial court therefore admitted reporter
notes of the witnesses' testimony admitted at a former trial.38 The
defendant asserted that the admission of the testimony violated his
sixth amendment rights.39
In arriving at the conclusion to admit the testimony, the Court
found that ". .. [t]here is doubtless reason for saying that the
accuser should never lose the benefit of these safeguards [b]ut general rules of law must occasionally give way to considerations of
public policy and the necessities of the case." 4
Seventy-five years after Mattox, in California v. Green,4 the
United States Supreme Court considered as substantive evidence
the application of the confrontation clause to the admissibility of
prior inconsistent statements.42 In Green, a sixteen-year-old
youth, Porter, was arrested for selling marijuana to an undercover
agent.43 While in custody at Green's preliminary hearing, Porter,
subject to extensive cross-examination, named Green as his supplier.44 At Green's trial, Porter, the state's chief witness, claimed
he was unable to remember who supplied him with the mari35. Id.
36. 156 U.S. 237 (1895).
37. Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 250 (1895).
38. Id. at 238-39.
39. Id. at 240. In reviewing the impact of the confrontation clause on the hearsay
testimony the Supreme Court noted the following:
The primary object of the constitutional provision in question was to prevent
depositions or ex parte affidavits being used against the prisoner in lieu of a
personal examination and cross-examination of the witness in which the accused
has an opportunity, not only of testing the recollection and sifting the conscience
of the witness, but of compelling him to stand face to face with the jury in order
that they may look at him, and judge by his demeanor upon the stand and the
manner in which he gives testimony whether he is worthy of belief.
Id. at 242-43.
40. Id. at 243.
41. 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
42. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 153 (1970).
43. Id. at 151.
44. Id.
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juana. 45 Throughout the direct examination of Porter, the prosecution read excerpts from Porter's preliminary hearing testimony,
in which Porter testified he had received marijuana from Green.
Green was subsequently convicted.4 6
In upholding Green's conviction, the United States Supreme
Court listed the following purposes of the confrontation clause:
1) to insure that the witness will give his statements under oath;
2) to force the witness to submit to cross-examination; and 3) to
permit the jury to observe the demeanor of the witness and assess
his credibility. 47 The Green Court concluded that had Porter been
unavailable, despite good-faith efforts of the state to produce him,
his statements would still have been admissible at trial.48
The Court in Davis v. Alaska, 49 decided in 1973, held that a
defendant in a criminal case was allowed to impeach a juvenile
witness by cross-examination as to the juvenile's past record of
delinquency and that his impeachment may occur even though it
conflicted with the state's interest in preserving the confidentiality
of juvenile adjudications of delinquency.5° In allowing the use of
the juvenile record to impeach, the Court balanced the state's
interest in protecting the anonymity of juvenile offenders with the
defendant's right of confrontation and ruled that the confrontational right was paramount.5 '
The Supreme Court delivered several opinions in the early
1980s which held in accordance with the rationale of these past
decisions. For instance, in Ohio v. Roberts5 2 the preliminary hearing testimony of an unavailable witness was held admissible at trial
after an initial finding of necessity and the presence of adequate
indicia of reliability.53 In Roberts, the Court noted that a literal
reading of the language of the confrontation clause would require,
on objection, the exclusion of any statement made by a declarant
not present at trial.-' The Roberts Court reiterated that the con45. Id. at 151-52.
46. Id. at 152-53.
47. Green, 399 U.S. at 158.
48. Id. at 165.
49. 415 U.S. 308 (1974).
50. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 320 (1974). The Court found, subject to the broad
discretion of the trial judge, that cross-examination was the principal means by which to test
the believability of a witness and the truth of the witness' testimony. Id. at 316.
51. Id. at 319-20.
52. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
53. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 73 (1980).
54. Id. at 63 (emphasis added). To read the confrontation clause literally "would
abrogate virtually every hearsay exception, a result long rejected as unintended and too
extreme." Id. Rather, the confrontation clause operated in two separate ways to restrict
the admission of hearsay. Id. at 65. First, the rule of necessity dictated that the prosecution
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frontation clause reflected a preference for face-to-face confrontation at trial and that cross-examination was a primary interest
secured by the clause,55 but nonetheless the Court emphasized
that the right to confront and cross-examine was not absolute and
may give way to accommodate competing interests.56
The Supreme Court in United States v. Inadi57 examined the
use of the out-of-court statements of a co-conspirator at trial.'
The Court held that, in the context of the "admission of the out-ofcourt statements of a non-testifyink: co-conspirator," the confrontation clause did not require a showi~g of unavailability by the prosecutor. 59 The Court found that the electronically recorded coconspirator statements could be introduced against the defendant,
even though the prosecutor had made little effort to produce the
co-conspirator at trial.60 The Court determined that co-conspirator statements "derive much of their value from the fact that they
were made in a context very different from trial" and that it was
unlikely that in-court testimony would recapture the evidentiary
significance of statements made during the course of the conspiracy. 61 Consequently, the prosecutor may offer the out-of-court
statements of the co-conspirator whether the declarant is available
at trial or not, and the state has no obligation to produce the
declarant.6 2
In Delawarev. Fensterer63 the Supreme Court was presented
with a further opportunity to clarify the protections extended by
the right of confrontation.' In Fensterer,the prosecution relied in
part on expert testimony that two hairs found on the murder
must either produce, or demonstrate the unavailability of the hearsay declarant. Id. And,
second, once the declarant was shown to be unavailable, the statement was admissible only
if it bears adequate indicia of reliability. Id. at 65-66.
55. Id. at 63 (emphasis added).
56. See id. at 66.
57. 475 U.S. 387 (1986).
58. United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 388 (1986).
59. Id. at 399-400.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 395-96.
62. Inadi, 475 U.S. at 399-400. The Inadi court also noted that the rule of Roberts
required the prosecution to establish that a witness was unavailable before it may admit the
witness's testimony from a prior proceeding in the place of live testimony at trial. Id. at
392-94.
Roberts and Inadi produced two divergent rules: First, in the case of prior statements,
the state is required to establish unavailability; second, in the case of out-of-court statements
by co-conspirators, there is no such requirement. The prosecution of cases involving child
witnesses often involves questions about the admissibility of prior testimony, and this type
of admissibility question is controlled by Roberts. The prosecution of these cases will
seldom involve determinations as to the admissibility of co-conspirator testimony, so the
precise rule set forth by Inadi will not often apply.
63. 474 U.S. 15 (1985).
64. Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 16 (1985).
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weapon were similar to those of the victim and that one of the
hairs had been forcibly removed from the victim.6 The expert
described three methods of determining that a hair was forcibly
removed, but during cross-examination the expert was unable to
recall which method he had relied on for his conclusion.'
In allowing the testimony, the Court concluded that the "Confrontation Clause guarantees an opportunity for effective crossexamination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever
way, and to whatever extent the defense might wish." 67 The
Court stated that the expert testimony carried the necessary assurance of reliability, notwithstanding the witness' inability to recall
the basis of the testimony, because the witness had testified under
68
oath and in the presence of the defendant and the factfinder.
In 1987 the Court decided two cases involving confrontation
clause questions in child sexual abuse litigation, Pennsylvania v.
Ritchie 9 and Kentucky v. Stincer.70 In Ritchie the defendant was
charged with committing various sexual crimes against his thirteen-year-old daughter.71 In preparation for his defense, the
defendant attempted to subpoena child protection service records
concerning his daughter, asserting the records contained exculpatory evidence and that the confrontation clause required their disclosure. 72 The plurality opinion held that failure to disclose the
information did not violate the confrontation clause, because the
right to confrontation is a trial right and "does not compel the pretrial production of information that might be useful in preparing
3
for

trial."

7

In Stincer, the Court held that there was no violation of the
confrontation clause when a defendant was excluded from a hearing to determine the testimonial competency of two child witnesses.74 In Stincer, the defendant was charged with the sexual
65. Id. at 16-17.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 20 (emphasis in original).
68. Id. at 21-22.
69. 480 U.S. 39 (1987).
70. 482 U.S. 730 (1987).
71. Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 43 (1987).
72. Id. at 43-44.
73. Id. at 53 n.9. Reaffirming prior decisions, the Supreme Court noted that a
confrontation clause infringement claim will only be upheld when there is "a specific
statutory or court-imposed restriction at trial on the scope of the question." Id. at 53-54.
While four of the Justices found that the confrontation clause did not afford a right to
pretrial discovery, a majority of the Court concluded that the due process clause mandated
discovery in some cases. Id. at 61.
74. Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 744 (1987).
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abuse of three children.7 5 At trial, but before the presentation of
evidence, the trial court conducted competency hearings in chambers.7 8 Over defendant's objection, the defendant was excluded
from the examinations.77 His attorney was permitted to attend the
examinations and8 to question the children regarding their compe7
tence to testify.
The Court held in Stincer that because the alleged violation of
the defendant's right of confrontation occurred at a pretrial hearing in which the girls were not asked about the substantive issues,
the exclusion of the defendant did not violate his rights.79 Further, the Court held that the defendant's right to confront the witnesses was not violated because his exclusion from the competency
hearing did not interfere with his opportunity for full and complete cross-examination.80
Finally, in 1988, the Supreme Court decided Coy v. Iowa.8 1
The Coy decision is remarkable in that it is a substantial departure

from prior confrontation analysis. It may, in fact, foreshadow decisions by the Court82 that impact and change the emerging body of
75. Id. at 732. The Court explained that immediately prior to the competency

hearing, the prosecutor dismissed the charge regarding one of the children because the
child was not believed to be competent to testify. Id. at 732 n.l.
76. Id. at 732.
77. Id. at 732-33.
78. Id. at 733.

79. Stincer, 482 U.S. at 740-44.
80. Id. After the trial court found the two witnesses competent to testify, they
appeared and testified at trial. Id. The defendant was present throughout crossexamination and could assist his counsel. ld.
81. 487 U.S. 1012 (1988).
82. For an in-depth analysis of these cases, refer to the case notes in this issue. Editor.
The Supreme Court accepted certiorari in Maryland v. Craig,316 Md. 551, 560 A.2d 1120
(1989), No. 89478, cert. granted, 110 S. Ct. 834 (U.S. Jan. 16, 1990XNo. 89478), and in
Idaho v. Wright, 116 Idaho 382, 775 P.2d 1224 (1989), No. 89-260, cert. granted, 110 S. Ct.
833 (U.S. Jan. 16, 199OXNo. 89-260). Both of these cases present confrontation questions
and involve children witnesses or victims.
In Craig, four children, ages four to seven, testified via one-way closed-circuit
television. Craig, 316 Md. at _ 560 A.2d at 1122. At a pre-trial hearing, expert testimony
showed that each child would be unable to testify in the presence of the defendant. Id. at
560 A.2d at 1122. The state moved to allow the children to testify through closed-circuit
television pursuant to a Maryland statute. Id. See MD. OS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 9102 (1989), which provides that, in a case of child abuse, the court:
[M]ay order that the testimony of a child victim be taken outside the courtroom
and shown in the courtroom by means of closed circuit television if,
(i) The testimony is taken during the proceedings; and
(ii) The judge determines that testimony by the child victim in the
courtroom will result in the child suffering serious emotional distress such
that the child cannot reasonably communicate.
Id. Notwithstanding express findings by the trial court, Maryland's appellate court
reversed, holding that Coy required a face-to-face meeting between the defendant and
each child prior to the invocation of the televised procedure. Craig,316 Md. at _ 560 A.2d
at 1127.
The question presented to the Court is as follows:
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law addressing the special needs of children as witnesses. s3
In Coy, the Court found that the defendant's right to confrontation was violated by the presence of a screen which enabled the
child witnesses to avoid a visual encounter with the accused.'
Where individualized findings regarding the need to protect the child witnesses
are made and the witnesses, ages four to seven, are subjected to cross-exanunation at trial, does the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause require a face-toface meeting between the witnesses and the accused before a one-way closedcircuit television procedure may be invoked?" Brief of the Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, State of Florida, at i, Maryland v. Craig, 316 Md. 551, 560 A.2d
1120 (1989), No. 89-478, cert. granted,110 S. Ct. 834 (U.S. Jan. 16, 199OXNo. 89478).
In Wright, the trial court held that the two and one-half year-old witness was not capable of communicating with the jury. Idaho v. Wright, 116 Idaho 382,_._, 775 P.2d 1222,
1225 (1989), cert. granted, 110 S. Ct. 833 (U.S. Jan. 16, 1990XNo. 89-478). Pursuant to Rule
803(24) of the Idaho Rules of Evidence, the pediatrician who examined the child testified as
to statements made by the child to the pediatrician at the time of the child's examination.
Id. IDAHO R. EVID 803(24) provides the following:

Rule 803. Hearsay exceptions; availability of declarant immaterial.... The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available as a witness
04) Other exceptions. A statement not specifically covered by any of the foregoing exceptions but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, if the court determines that (A) the statement is offered as evidence of a
material fact; (B) the statement is more probative on the point for which it is
offered than any other evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purposes of these rules and the interests of
justice will best be served by admission of the statement into evident. A statement may not be admitted under this exception unless the proponent of it makes
known to the adverse party sufficiently in advance of the trial or hearing to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it, the proponent's intention to offer the statement and the particulars of it, including the
name and address of the declarant.
Id." The defendant was convicted and the conviction was overturned by the Idaho Supreme
Court, holding that the testimony was inadmissible because it violated the confrontation
clause. Wright, 116 Idaho at -, 775 P.2d at 1231.
The question presented to the United States Supreme Court on appeal is:
Whether the "indicia of reliability" and "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness" mandated by the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause require that
the hearsay statement of a very young victim of sexual abuse to an examining
pediatrician be excluded unless the prosecution establishes that (a) the interview
was either audio or videotaped; (b) leading questions were not used; and (c) the
examining pediatrician conducting the interview did not have any preconceived
idea of what the child should be disclosing."
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Idaho v. Wright, 116 Idaho 382, 775 P.2d 1224 (1989), No.
89-260, cert. granted, 110 S. Ct. 833 (U.S. Jan. 16, 1990XNo. 89-260).
83. S. Res. 1923, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) is a further example of emerging law.
Introduced on November 19, 1989, this bill is commonly called the "Child Victim's Bill of
Rights." This bill legislates alternatives to in-court testimony for child victims and witnesses
involved with proceedings in the federal system. Id. It includes, for example, provisions for
testimony via two-way closed circuit television if the court finds that such a means of
providing testimony would be in the child's best interest. Id. It also provides for the use of
anatomically correct dolls, puppets and other testimonial aids to facilitate the child's
testimony. Id.
84. Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. at 1012, 1022 (1988). The criminal act took place in August
1985, when two thirteen-year-old girls were camping overnight in their backyard. Id. at
1014. During the early morning hours a masked assailant crawled into their tent, and while
shining a flashlight in their faces, warned them not to look at his face. Id. The defendant
then sexually assaulted the girls. Id. Since the girls never had an opportunity to see the
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Pursuant to Iowa law, and over the objection of the defendant, the
trial court granted the state's request that a screen be placed
between the witness and the defendant during the testimony of
the child witnesses.85 The screening device allowed the judge,
jury, counsel and defendant to view the witnesses, however, the
device did not allow the witnesses to see the defendant.' The
defendant was found guilty on two counts of engaging in lascivious
acts with a child 7 and appealed, contending, in part, that the
courtroom procedures had violated his constitutional right of confrontation because the use of the screen allowed him to see and
hear the victims testify but prevented them from seeing him.8
The Iowa Supreme Court upheld the conviction and found
that the defendant's constitutional rights were not violated by the
use of the screen.' The court noted that both children were
under oath and subject to full cross-examination by counsel, in
view of the jury, judge, and defendant. 9°
The United States Supreme Court reversed the Iowa Supreme
Court, ruling that the screen did violate the defendant's right to
confrontation under the sixth amendment.91 The Court ruled that
face of their assailant there was not an issue of identification. Id. at 1026 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
85. State v. Coy, 397 N.W.2d 730, 733 (Iowa 1986), rev'd, Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012

(1988).

86. Coy, 487 U.S. at 1026-27 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
87. Id. at 1015.

88. Id. On appeal to the Iowa Supreme Court, the defendant asserted that his

constitutional right to confront the witnesses against him was violated. State v. Coy, 397
N.W.2d 730, 730-31 (Iowa 1986). He also claimed his right to due process was infringed in
that the use of the screen created a strong inference of guilt. id. at 733. Further, in
challenging the trial court's authorization of the screening device, he did not argue that the
trial court had failed to comply with the statutory requirements, but that the court must
make a finding of necessity prior to implementing the statutory protections. Id.
89. Id. at 734.
90. Coy, 397 N.W.2d at 734. The Iowa Supreme Court concluded that the trial court
was not required to make an individualized finding of necessity. Id. The court also rejected
the assertion that the defendant's right to due process was violated, noting that the use of
the screen was not inherently prejudicial. Id. at 734-35.
91. Coy, 487 U.S. at 1022. Justice Scalia, writing for the plurality, traced the history of
the sixth amendment, noting that references to a face-to-face meeting between the accused
and the accuser can be found in ancient Roman law, in the writings of Shakespeare, the
speeches of President Eisenhower, and the Supreme Court's past decisions. Id. at 1015-19.
The plurality concluded:
The Sixth Amendment guarantee of face-to-face encounter between witness and
accused serves ends related both to appearances and to reality. This opinion is
embellished with references to and quotations from antiquity in part to convey
that there is something deep in human nature that regards face-to-face
confrontation between accused and accuser as 'essential to a fair trial in a
criminal prosecution.' . . .Given these human feelings of what is necessary for
fairness, the right of confrontation 'contributes to the establishment of a system
of criminal justice in which the perception as well as the reality of fairness
prevails.' . . .The State can hardly gainsay the profound effect upon a witness of
standing in the presence of the person the witness accuses, since that is the very
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the screening procedure was an "obvious and damaging violation
of the defendant's right to a face-to-face encounter." 92 While leaving "for another day" the question as to whether any exceptions
do exist to the right to face-to-face confrontation, the Supreme
Court noted that there certainly was no exception available for the
Iowa procedure.93 The Court also strongly hinted that exceptions
will be rare if at all, and must be "firmly... rooted in our jurisprudence," and would only be allowed upon an "individualized"
showing that it was necessary in a particular case.94 Because the
1985 Iowa statutory exception was not "firmly rooted," and the
state had not made a showing that the children needed special
protection, "the judgment could not be sustained by any conceiva"' 95
ble exception.
phenomenon it relies upon to establish the potential 'trauma' that allegedly
justified the extraordinary procedure in the present case. That face-to-face
presence may, unfortunately, upset the truthful rape victim or abused child; but
by the same token it may confound and undo the false accuser, or reveal the
child coached by a malevolent adult. It is a truism that constitutional protections
have costs.
Id. at 1017-20. Justice Scalia attributed most of the Court's prior encounters with the confrontation clause to the existence of "room for doubt" as to what extent the clause included
the implicit rights of either admissibility of out-of-court statements or restrictions on the
scope of cross-examination. Id. at 1022. In other words, these two elements have been the
most frequently litigated confrontation questions, not because these elements are the
essence of the clause's protection, but because there is some doubt that the protections exist
at all. Id. The Court determined that reasonably implicit rights conferred by the confrontation clause may at times give way to competing and important interests. Id. However, as
to the right narrowly and explicitly set forth in the clause - the right to meet face-to-face
all those who appear and give evidence at trial - the Court left for another day, the question as to whether any exceptions exist. Id. at 1021.
92. Coy, 487 U.S. at 1020.
93. Id. at 1021.
94. Id. The state maintained that the showing of necessity was established by the Iowa
statute in that the statute created a legislative presumption of trauma. Id. at 1020. The
Court responded by finding that even as to the weaker implicit element of the clause,
something more than the generalized findings underlying this type of statute is needed
when the exception was not "firmly... rooted in our jurisprudence." Id. at 1021 (citations

omitted).
95. Id. The Supreme Court concluded that the right of face-to-face confrontation was
subject to a harmless error analysis and reversed and remanded the case to the Iowa
Supreme Court for consideration as to whether the error was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt. Id. at 1022. Justice O'Connor wrote a concurring opinion, joined by Justice White,
agreeing that exceptions should be allowed only upon a "case-specific finding of necessity,"
and cannot be based upon the "generalized legislative finding" of necessity in the present
case. Id. at 1025 (O'Connor, J., concurring). She noted that the concurrence was authored
to make clear that the rights protected by the confrontation clause are not absolute. Id.
Bather, the confrontation clause "reflects a preference for face-to-face confrontation at
trial" but may give way in an appropriate case to competing interests and thus permit the
use of procedural devices designed to shield a child witness from the trauma of courtroom
testimony. Id. at 1022-24.
The dissenting justices, in an opinion written by Justice Blackmun and joined by the
Chief Justice, were not persuaded by the plurality's version of the historical or legal
justification for the preeminent protection of a literal right to face-to-face confrontation. Id.
at 1025 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). At most, the dissent concluded, the clause demonstrated
a "preference" for face-to-face confrontation, and certainly not an absolute right. Id. at
1028. Further, the dissent noted a fear that the majority's focus on the witness' ability to
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Both the concurrence and the dissent rejected any suggestion
in the plurality opinion that the right to face-to-face confrontation
was absolute. 96 Concurring in the result, Justice O'Connor wrote
separately to make clear that a "literal interpretation of the Confrontation Clause could bar the use of any out-of-court statements
when the declarant is unavailable," and that "this Court has
rejected that view as unintended and too extreme."9'
The dissent concluded that the procedures employed at trial
did not offend the confrontation clause and noted that, for example, the exceptions to the rule against hearsay demonstrate that
physical confrontation is not an "essential part of the protections
afforded by the Confrontation Clause."" The dissent cited Dutton
v. Evans,9 wherein the Supreme Court held that the admission of
an out-of-court co-conspirator's statement did not violate the confrontation clause.' ° ° In Dutton, the Court focused on the reliability of the statement and the potential effect of crossexamination, 101 never mentioning the fact that the declarant
could not see the defendant at the time he made his accusatory
statement. 10 2 Further, the dissent noted that hearsay statements
are often made outside the presence of the defendant, yet the
focus of the Court's past decisions as to the admissibility of these
statements has3 not been whether there was physical
0
confrontation.1

Although the Coy decision has sparked debate, scholars who
have attempted to reconcile it with past decisions" have found
see the defendant will lead the states that are attempting to adopt protective measures for
children-victims of sexual abuse to "sacrifice" the more central confrontation concerns,
such as the right of cross-examination or the right to have the trier of fact observe the
witness' demeanor. Id. The dissent also concluded that there was rno reason why every
exception to the right to face-to-face confrontation must be justified by a case-specific
finding of necessity. Id. at 1034-35. Rather, the narrow constitutional preference at issue in
this case was outweighed by the "important public policy, embodied in the Iowa statute."
Id. at 1032.
96. Id. at 1022 (O'Connor, J., concurring), Id. at 1026 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
97. Id. at 1022 (O'Connor, J., concurring); Id. at 1026 (Blaclmun, J., dissenting).
98. Id. at 1030 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
99. 400 U.S. 74 (1970).
100. Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 83 (1970).
101. Id.
102. See id. at 97 (Harlan, J., concurringXthe question is whether there has been
adequate "confrontation" to satisfy the requirement of the Confrontation Clause).
103. Coy, 487 U.S. at 1026 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
104. Mayer, Protecting the Child Sexual Abuse Victim from Courtroom Trauma after
Coy v. Iowa, 67 N.C. L.REv. 711,721 (1989Xconcluded that Coy fails to provide a complete
analysis of its exception test, but by looking to the standards for the admission of hearsay
evidence this can be, in part, corrected). The plurality concluded that the long-recognized
constitutional safeguards did not provide the defendant with sufficient protection in the
absence of physical confrontation. Coy, 487 U.S. at 1022. Looking to the safeguards set by
prior decisions, it would seem difficult to reconcile Coy. There was no dispute that the
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that there are some common threads from which to analyze the
confrontation law in light of Coy. °0 It is apparent that the Court's
failure to finalize the question as to the constitutionality of visual
confrontation exceptions'06 gives little guidance to state courts,
leaving them to struggle unaided with the constitutionality of their
recently enacted statutes. 1°7
Analysis of confrontation questions centers on whether a witness is available to testify and to be cross-examined. Traditionally,
the hearsay rule and its exceptions have generated the body of law
wherein the unavailability or availability of a witness is scrutinized. An examination of hearsay questions will give a good basis
for the concept and parameters of witness availability.
screen did not obstruct the jury's, judge's, or defendant's view of the witnesses, nor the
witnesses' view of the jury or the judge. Id. at 1015. The witnesses were told that the
defendant could see and hear them. Id. The defendant's ability to confer with his counsel
was at no time interrupted or restricted. Id. The witnesses' testimony was given under
oath and subject to unrestricted cross-examination. Id. There was no issue as to the
admissibility of an out-of-court statement. See generally id. at 1016 (the confrontation
clause confers a right to meet face-to-face with those who would give evidence at trial).
Notwithstanding that these potential confrontation roadblocks, from prior caselaw, were
not present the plurality reversed the decision. Id. at 1022.
105. See Mayer, supra note 104, at 721. Forman, To Keep the Balance True: The Case
of Coy v. lowa, 40 HASTINGS LJ. 437,455 (1989XCoy will most likely only bar those statutes
that do not provide for two-way viewing and a necessity prone); Westen, Confrontationand
Compulsory Process: A Unified Theory of Evidencefor Criminal Cases, 91 HARv. L REV.
567, 600 (1978) ("[t]he State fully exhausts its obligation under the confrontation clause
once it produces its evidence in best available form.....
Tihe only remaining hurdle is ...
that all evidence... be sufficiently reliable for rational assessment by the trier of fact.").
106. See note 95 and accompanying text.
107. Forman, supra note 105, at 454. Forman speculated that the Coy decision may
foretell the invalidation of statutes and rules aimed at shielding child victims. Id. The
potential invalidation of these statutes and rules is illustrated by reference to Globe
Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982), which invalidated mandatory court
closure statutes:
After the Globe case invalidated mandatory closure statutes, only three reported
appellate court decisions upheld closure of the courtroom during the testimony
of a child sexual assault victim. The Globe decision could have been an opening
for trial judges to assess each individual case and protect the minor victim when
necessary. Instead, the decision served to reduce actual closures.
Forman, supra note 105, at 454.
In State v. Klein, 438 N.W.2d 798 (N.D. 1989) the North Dakota Supreme Court,
examined the issue of court closure. In Klein, the defendant appealed from a verdict finding him guilty of two counts of gross sexual imposition, from the judgment conviction and
from an order denying his motion for a new trial. Id. at 799. Immediately before the child
victim testified, the prosecution asked for and was granted a closed courtroom. Id. The
defendant contended that the trial court's exclusion of the public deprived him of his right
to a public trial under the sixth amendment. Id. The court, in arriving at its decision to
reverse and remand for a new trial, cited Globe and noted that a trial court must make a
particularized determination that a child witness is in need of the court's protection. Id. at
801. Klein was reversed and remanded for a new trial, leaving the prosecution the opportunity to again request exclusion of the general public during the victim's testimony, but
directing the trial judge to conduct a hearing and make specific findings. Id. at 803. But see
id. at 813 (Erickstad, J., dissenting).
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THE RULE: HEARSAY EXCEPTIONS

Hearsay is defined as an "[out-of-court] statement offered in
evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted."'10 s The prohibition against the admission of hearsay statements is predicated on
the belief that placing a witness under oath and subjecting the witness to effective cross-examination is the best way to get at the
9
l

truth. 1

A.

OUT-OF-COURT STATEMENT

A statement is considered to have been made out-of-court
unless it was made while the declarant was testifying under oath,
before the trier of fact, and subject to effective cross-examination." 0 Nonverbal conduct may be a statement and, therefore,
hearsay, if it was intended to be an assertion.111 Because nonverbal and verbal assertions may be statements for the purpose of
their admissibility under the hearsay rule, the form of the statement must be carefully considered. A statement for the purpose
of hearsay analysis may be made when a person speaks, writes,
acts, or does not act (if the failure to act is intended by the actor to
11 2
be an assertion).
Most commonly, the statement at issue in a child sexual abuse
13
case will be the child's verbal assertion as to what occurred.1
108. N.D.R. EVID. 801(e).

109. N.D.R. EVID. 801 (explanatory note).
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. See In re Penelope B, 104 Wash. 2d 643, _ 709 P.2d 1185, 1192 (1985). It is
important to realize that a child's nonassertive verbal utterances and nonverbal conduct
may not be hearsay. For instance, the Washington Supreme Court, upon reviewing the
question of hearsay evidence in conjunction with the activities of a five-year-old victim of
sexual abuse, noted the following:
[I]f in a child abuse case someone walks into a place where the child is, or that
person's name is mentioned, and the child involuntarily reacts by trembling,
running and hiding, screaming, crying, shouting "I hate you" or the like, then
such would be nonassertive utterances or nonverbal conduct and not hearsay.
*
*
*
Another example is the testimony of a therapist. The therapist testified that
Penelope was playing with an anatomically correct male doll and on her own, as
she was playing, "pushed the doll toward [the other therapist], within maybe one
or two feet [of the therapist's] face and said something like either 'put this in
your mouth' or 'suck me.' And at that point she was holding the penis of the doll
in her hand." This was a combination of nonassertive verbal and nonverbal
conduct; it was not hearsay and was admissible.
Other examples of nonassertive conduct by the child, as testified to by
others, included the following: Penelope's moods fluctuated between openness
and evasiveness; her uncomfortableness in handling the anatomically correct
dolls and not wanting to undress the male doll, her fearfulness and anxiety in
different contexts; her defensiveness when asked about "her secret"; her
barricading herself behind furniture or stuffed toys when talked to; and when, at
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Such a statement would be hearsay if offered to prove that the
defendant committed the act
and, therefore, inadmissible unless it
4
falls under an exception.'
A child's nonverbal conduct intended as an assertion may also
be hearsay. For instance, a child may respond to questioning by
nodding or pointing to an area of her body." 5 Any question of the
admissibility of a child's out-of-court utterance or conduct must be
analyzed as to the intent of the child 6when speaking, making the
gesture, or engaging in the conduct.1
B.

UNAVAILABILITY

An analysis of hearsay statements demands an examination of
the declarant's status to determine if the declarant is available to
appear at trial or is an unavailable witness." 7 If a hearsay declarant is available to testify in court and is subject to effective crossexamination regarding the out-of-court statement, the statement
may be admitted into evidence without confrontation concerns." 8
Confrontation questions arise when the declarant is unavailable to
testify at trial or is not subject to full and effective crossexamination.
not seeing her father someplace where she had expected to see him, her fear
that he was in jail. None of this was hearsay testimony and it was admissible.
In re Penelope B, 104 Wash. 2d 643, _, 709 P.2d 1185, 1192 (1985) (en banc). Similarly, a
child's statement about the act may not be hearsay but may be relevant for purposes other
than to prove that the defendant committed the act. Drumbarger v. State, 716 P.2d 6, 10
(Alaska Ct. App. 1986Xchild's statements to a police officer were admitted to show the child
had knowledge of what a penis was and were not admitted to prove that sexual abuse
occurred); State v. Iverson, 187 N.W.2d 1, 43 (N.D. 1971Xout-of-court statement was not
subject to the hearsay rule because it was not offered for the purpose of establishing the
truth of the matter asserted but for the purpose of establishing the fact that the statement
was made).
114. Drumbarger v. State, 716 P.2d 6, 9-10 (Alaska Ct. App. 1986Xchild's statement of
sexual abuse as reported to her mother, immediately after mother discovered defendant
dressing and child in bed, was held admissible under excited utterance exception); Perez v.
State, 536 So.2d 206, 209-10 (Fla. 1988Xstatements made by a child to police officer and
mother were hearsay but admissible under the child hearsay exception); But see Alston v.
United States, 462 A.2d 1122, 1127-28 (D.C. 1983Xfour-year-old's statement of sexual abuse
was hearsay and did not fall within any exceptions).
115. State v. Bawdon, 386 N.W.2d 484, 487 (S.D. 1986Xsix-year-old child nodded her
head affirmatively in response to physician who asked, "Did anyone touch you down there
in the genital area?" and the court held that it was nonverbal conduct intended as an
assertion and thus hearsay, but admissible under the medical diagnosis exception).
116. See supra notes 113-15.
117. See N.D.R. EVID. 804 (defines unavailability of a declarant to include situations
wherein the declarant is physically unavailable, as well as situations in which the declarant's
testimony cannot be obtained).
118. See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 301 (1973); California v. Green, 399
U.S. 149, 158 (1970). The out-of-court statement is not subject to contemporaneous crossexamination, but this is not a requirement to satisfy the confrontation clause. Id. See also
Roberts, 448 U.S. at 70 (concluded that it was permissible to admit at trial the preliminary
hearing testimony of a witness who was not available at trial).
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The primary factor when determining unavailability is not the
declarant's physical presence in court but whether the declarant's
testimony is available. 119 The three most common categories of
questions regarding the availability of a child witness arise in the
following areas: 1) the competency of the child; 2) the grounds
for unavailability defined by the rules of evidence; and 3) the
120
unwillingness or inability to testify.
1. Testimonial Competence
Rule 601 of the North Dakota Rules of Evidence states that
every person is competent to be a witness, unless otherwise provided in the rules.1 2 Rule 602 requires that witnesses may not
testify to a matter unless they have personal knowledge of the
119. Graham, The Confrontation Clause, the Hearsay Rule, and Child Sexual Abuse
Prosecutions: The State of the Relationship, 72 MINN. L. REv. 523, 524 (1988Xciting
Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66).
120. N.D.R. EVID. 603. In recent years courts have encountered a fourth category of
dispute as to potentially unavailable children witnesses and victims. This category, referred
to a "psychological unavailability" seems to have developed in response to the criminal
justice system's desire to utilize legally permissible means to protect children from
psychological trauma induced by the courtroom setting.
Testifying at trial can be a terrifying experience for a child. Psychiatrists have
identified the following components of legal proceedings that may place a child victim
under prolonged mental stress and endanger the child's emotional equilibrium: repeated
interrogations and cross-examination; facing the accused again; the official atmosphere in
court; the acquittal of the accused for lack of corroborating evidence to the child's
trustworthy testimony; and the conviction of a molester who is the child's parent or
relative. See generally Libai, The Protectionof the Child Victim of a Sexual Offense in the
CriminalJustice System, 15 WAYNE L. REv. 977, 1006-09 (1969). In some cases fear of
testifying or of facing the defendant can render the child unavailable. Id.
Psychological inquiry which renders a child unavailable differs from unavailability
because of mental illness or infirmity pursuant to Rule 804(aX4) of the North Dakota Rules
of Evidence. Mental illness or infirmity results from a mental illness, mental retardation, or
brain disorder. Id. Contrarily, psychological injury resulting in unavailability is caused by
the psychological trauma induced by the courtroom setting. Id.
Courts have wrestled with courtroom-induced trauma and the resultant unavailability.
See People v. Williams, 93 Cal. App. 3d 40, _, 155 Cal. Rptr. 414, 421 (1979Xsexual assault
victim was not found to be psychologically unavailable); Warren v. United States, 436 A.2d
821, 828 (D.C. 1981Xpsychiatrist testified that this victim would suffer far more mental
anguish than normally accompanies court appearances of sexual assault victims and that she
would be likely to suffer severe psychosis, even possibly become suicidal); State v. Drusch,
139 Wis.2d 312, 407 N.W.2d 328 (Ct. App. 1987Xchild was called to testify, began to cry,
and soon became unable to proceed. The court interviewed the child outside the jury's
presence and determined she was unavailable as a witness).
The threshold question as to whether or not a child is psychologically unavailable is
whether a child's fear of the courtroom setting rises to the level of rendering the child
psychologically unavailable. It has been determined that psychological unavailability
requires more than a mere showing of the possibility of emotional distress or trauma, even
more than showing a likelihood that the emotional distress or trauma will be substantial or
severe. Graham, supra note 119, at 560. Rather, to establish psychological unavailability
there must be "a showing of a substantial likelihood of severe emotional or mental
harm .
I.."
Id.
121. Rule 601 of the North Dakota Rules of Evidence states: "Every person is
competent to be a witness except as otherwise provided in these rules." N.D.R. EVID. 601.
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matter. 1" Rule 603 requires that all witnesses declare that they
will testify truthfully, by oath or affirmation."'3 Together these
rules establish that every person must be competent to testify, is
required to have been properly sworn, and have personal knowledge of the matter at issue.
Because the rules declare that "every person is competent 1to
24
be a witness," any examination on competency is unnecessary
and may be prohibited.'2 Rather, the trier of fact will evaluate
the weight and credibility of the witness' testimony. 12
The rules of evidence give the trial judge broad discretion to
exclude some witnesses from the stand. For example, the trial
judge may look to a standard of minimal credibility, determining
that a witness so lacks credibility that her testimony is not relevant. 127 Likewise, with a very young child or a child who is intellectually-handicapped, the trial judge may conclude that the child
so lacks basic cognitive ability as to not understand what she
observed and therefore lacks personal knowledge.12
Rule 603 requires that a witness understand the difference
between the truth and a lie, and appreciate the duty to tell the
truth.' 2 A child who demonstrates an inability to understand and
demonstrate either or both of these concepts may be excluded.
Pursuant to Rule 611(a), the court has discretion to control the
presentation of evidence.130 For instance, if the child is one of several witnesses, the trial judge may determine that the child's testimony is cumulative and exclude it.
Although the language of Rule 601 is clear, that every person
122. Rule 602 of the North Dakota Rules of Evidence states: A witness may not testify
to a matter unless evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that the witness has
personal knowledge of the matter. Evidence to prove personal knowledge may, but need
not, consist of the witness' own testimony. This rule is subject to the provisions of Rule 703,
relating to opinion testimony by expert witnesses. N.D.R. EvID. 602.
123. Rule 603 of the North Dakota Rules of Evidence states: "Before testifying, every
witness must be required to declare that the witness will testify truthfully, by oath or
affirmation administered in a form calculated to awaken the witness' conscience and
impress the witness' mind with the duty to do so." N.D.R. EVID. 603.
124. N.D.R. EvID. 601 (explanatory noteXevaluation of a witness should be
accomplished by the trier of fact); see State v. Schill, 406 N.W.2d 660, 662 (N.D. 1987X"the
evaluation of a particular witness is best left to the trier of fact through the process of
weighing the testimony and assessing its credibility, rather than by the prior imposition of
standards of competence.").
125. State v. Dwyer, 143 Wis. 2d 448, -, 422 N.W.2d 121, 126 (Ct. App. 1988Xunder
Rule 601 judges may not determine the competency of a witness. Rather, questions of
competence are credibility issues for the trier of fact).
126. Schill, 406 N.W.2d at 662.
127. N.D.R. EVID 401.
128. See generally N.D.R. EVID. 602.
129. N.D.R. EvID. 603.
130. N.D.R. EVID. 611(a).
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is competent to be a witness, it is also clear from the rules of evidence that the trial judge has the authority to control the presentation of evidence and exclude witnesses.'13 As demonstrated
above, the trial judge has many alternatives to bar the admission of
testimony that the judge determines should be excluded.'13 In
keeping with the intent of Rule 601, it would seem the scale
should tip in favor of allowing the testimony to be heard, thus,
enabling the trier of fact to3 determine the weight and credibility
3
of the witness' testimony.1

2. Provisions Under North Dakota Rules of Evidence 804
Rule 804 of the North Dakota Rules of Evidence defines five
grounds for the unavailability of a declarant's testimony: 1) privilege; 2) refusing to testify; 3) lack of memory; 4) death, physical
3
illness, mental illness or infirmity; and 5) absence.1 1
A witness who successfully asserts a claim of privilege is
unavailable to testify as to matters within the scope of the privilege. 3 5 Similarly, a witness who refuses to testify concerning the
subject matter of a statement despite a court order to do so is
unavailable.'13 Likewise, a witness who testifies to lack of memory
131. N.D.R. EVID. 611 (explanatory note). Interestingly, the explanatory note to Rule
611 includes the following language: 'The trial judge may allow a child witness to use an
anatomically correct doll if a proper foundation is laid. The doll may not be used in a
suggestive manner and the nonverbal testimony must be relevant." Id.
132. See, e.g., N.D.R. EVID.401 (the definition of relevant evidence); N.D.R. EVID. 602
(lack of personal knowledge); N.D.R. EVID. 603 (oath or affirmation).
133. N.D.R. EvID. 601 (explanatory note).
134. N.D.R. EVID. 804(aXH5). Rules 804(aX1)-(5) of the North Dakota Rules of
Evidence provide:
(a) DEFINITION OF UNAVAILABILITY. "Unavailability as a witness" includes
situations in which the declarant (1) is exempted by ruling of the court on the grounds of privilege from
testifying concerning the subject matter of the declarant's statement;
(2) persists in refusing to testify concerning the subject mattter of the
declarant's statement despite an order of the court to do so;
(3) testifies to a lack of memory of the subject matter of the declarant's
statement;
(4) is unable to be present or to testify at the hearing because of death or
then existing physical or mental illness or infirmity; and
(5) is absentfrom the hearing and the proponent of a statement has been
unable to procure the declarant's attendance (or in the case of a hearsay
exception under subdivision (b) (2), (3), or (4), the declarant's attendance
or testimony) by process or other reasonable means.
Id.
135. N.D.R. EVID. 804(aXl). See supra note 134 for the text of rule 804(aXl). Inadi,
475 U.S. at 399-400 (witness unavailable because of claim of privilege against selfincrimination).
136. N.D.R. EvID. 804(aX3). See supra note 134 for the text of rule 804(aX3). Partial
lack of memory does not necessarily render a witness unavailable. See State v. Marcum, 750
P.2d 599, 603 (Utah 1988Xchild not unavailable because of failure to recollect the answer to
one question).
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as to the subject matter of the statement is unavailable. 137 The
rule also provides that a witness who is unable to testify at the
hearing because of death, physical or mental illness, or infirmity is
unavailable.138 Finally, a witness is unavailable when the witness
is absent from the hearing and his presence
cannot be secured by
139
process or other reasonable means.

3. Unwilling or Unable to Testify
Unavailability may be shown when a child is unwilling or
unable to testify in court.' 40 Such unavailability may occur when
the child has
gone beyond the jurisdiction of the court 14 1 or cannot
42
be found.1

IV.

TRADITIONAL METHODS FOR INTRODUCING OUTOF-COURT STATEMENTS BY CHILDREN

Hearsay statements by children, when permitted into evidence, typically have fallen within one of three exceptions to the
hearsay rule: 1) excited utterance;1 43 2) statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment; 144 or 3) statements not
covered by traditional hearsay exceptions 1 45 that have equivalent
137. N.D.R. EVID. 804(aX2). See supra note 134 for the text of rule 804(aX2).
138. N.D.R. EVID. 804(aX4). See supra note 134 for the text of rule 804(aX4). See also
State v. Drusch, 139 Wis. 2d 312, _. 407 N.W.2d 328, 332 (Ct. App. 1987Xeight-year-old
child was found to be unavailable due to existing physical or mental illness or infirmity; the
trial court determined that she was so frightened and emotionally upset by the presence of
the jury, the trial setting and the offense itself, that she was unable to testify and would
continue in that inability in the near future.").
139. N.D.R. EVID. 804(aX5). See supra note 134 for the text of rule 804(aX5). See also
Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 77 (1980Xwitness was found to be constitutionally unavailable
who could not be found and state's efforts to have her present for hearing included issuance
of and unsuccessful delivery of five subpoenas).
140. Graham, supra note 119, at 562.
141. People v. Arguello, 737 P.2d 436, 437-38 (Colo. Ct. App. 1987Xchild was found
unavailable because she was out-of-state at the time of the third trial, after having testified
twice, and her parents refused to bring her back).
142. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 77 (witness who prosecutor made good faith effort to find,
including issuance of five subpoenas which were not successfully delivered, was
constitutionally unavailable).
143. N.D.R. EvID. 803(2). Rule 803(2) of the North Dakota Rules of Evidence provides:
EXCITED UTTEBANCE. A statement relating to a startling event or condition
made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement aused by the event
or condition.
Id.
144. N.D.R. EVID. 803(4). Rule 803(4) of the North Dakota Rules of Evidence provides:
STATEMENTS

FOR

PURPOSES

OF

MEDICAL

DIAGNOSIS

OR

TREATMENT.

Statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing
medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the
inception or general character of the cause or external source thereof insofar as
reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment.
Id.
145. Traditional hearsay exceptions are the first 23 exceptions in rule 803 of the
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14 6
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness.

A.

EXCITED UTTERANCES

Both the Federal Rules of Evidence and the North Dakota
Rules of Evidence provide a hearsay exception for statements
"relating to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or
condition.

147

As to the "startling event," most courts have little difficulty
finding that an alleged sexual assault constitutes such an occurrence, especially for a young child.' 48 This is so despite research
indicating that most children do not view a sexual assault episode
as shocking 49 and may not know that what has happened to them
was wrong.' 50
Of greater concern to courts has been the delay between the
event and the statement of the child.' 5 ' Even if the child recognizes the nature of the abuse, a report may not be immediately
forthcoming for any one of a variety of reasons. For instance, the
child may have been threatened "not to tell,' '152 may fear no one
Federal Rules of Evidence and the first four exceptions in rule 804(b) of the Federal Rules
of Evidence. FED. R. EVID. 803(24).

146. N.D.R. EVID. 803(25). Rule 803(25) of the North Dakota Rules of Evidence
provides:
A statement not specifically covered by any of the foregoing exceptions but
having circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, if the court determines that
(i) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (ii) the statement is
more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence
which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and (iii) the
general purposes of these rules and the interests of justice will best be served by
admission of the statement into evidence. A statement may not be admitted
under this exception unless the proponent of it makes known to the adverse
party and to the court in writing sufficiently in advance of its offer in evidence to
provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it, the
proponent's intention to offer the statement and the particulars of it, including
the name and address of the declarant.
Id. Before March 1, 1990, this residual exception provision was Rule 803(24).
147. FED. R. EvID. 803(2) and N.D.R. EvID. 803(2). See supra note 143 for the text of
rule 803(2). The rationale for this exception to the hearsay rule is that the excitement of the
event greatly reduces the likelihood that the statement will be contrived, and the
spontaneity requirement reduces the possibility of reflection before the statement is made.
See Lancaster v. People, 200 Colo. 448, _ 615 P.2d 720, 722 (1980Xdefendant's conviction
for assault was affirmed despite fact that there was a time interval of one-half hour between
the alleged assault and the hearsay declaration).
148. People v. Miller, 58 Ill. App.3d 156, -, 373 N.E.2d 1077, 1080 (1978).
149. See D. FINKELHOR, SEXUALLY VICTIMIZED CHiLDnF

65 (1979) (only 26% of

women assaulted as children surveyed experienced shock after being sexually assaulted;
20% felt surprised).
150. Id. at 31.
151. State v. Messamore, 2 Hawaii App. 643, - 639 P.2d 413, 418-19 (1982).
152. Fitzgerald v. United States, 443 A.2d 1295, 1298 (D.C. 1982).
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will believe her,15 3 or may feel confusion and guilt."5 Perhaps in
recognition of these factors, courts have been liberal in admitting
55
hearsay statements under the excited utterance exception.1
This "stretching" of the bounds of the excited utterance
exception has been justified by various circumstantial guarantees
of trustworthiness including spontaneity.'5 When admissible, the
statement becomes substantive evidence.' 57
It is suggested that as more states adopt an exception specifically addressing statements by children in sexual abuse cases, the
traditional bounds of the excited utterance exception will be more
rigidly followed.' 58

153. The feminine gender is referred to in child sexual abuse cases because female
children are victimized much more frequently than male children. J. BARuKAs, VICTIMs 130
(1978). "For every ten girl victims (of sexual abuse) there is one boy victim.' Id.
154. Stevens & Berliner, Special Techniques for Child Witnesses, in THE SEXUAL
VICIMOLOGY OF YOUTH 246, 251 (L. Schultz ed. 1980).
155. See State v. Ritchey, 107 Ariz. 552, -, 490 P.2d 558, 562 (1971Xalthough child
witness did not exhibit shock or nervous excitement and was subdued in manner, statement
admitted as excited utterance), Statements have been admitted even though they were
made hours and even days after the startling event. See People v. Sandoval, 709 P.2d 90,91
(Colo. Ct. App. 1985Xchild's statement to neighbor 14 hours after assault admissible as
excited utterance); State v. Noble, 342 So.2d 170, 172-73 (La. 1977Xcourt admitted
statement of four-year-old victim made two days after rape); State v. Ramirez, 46 Wash.
App. 223, _ 730 P.2d 98, 102 (1986) (statement made sometime after the event was
admitted as an excited utterance); State v. Woodward, 32 Wash. App. 204,_, 646 P.2d 135,
137 (1982Xstatement by five-year-old victim made 20 hours after event was admissible as an
excited utterance).
Moreover, the fact that the child's statement was made in response to inquiry from
another person does not automatically bar its admission under this exception. See State v.
Bethune, 232 NJ. Super 532, -, 557 A.2d 1025, 1028 (1989); but see State v. Ryan, 103
Wash. 2d 165, -, 691 P.2d 197, 205 (1984).
156. See, e.g., United States v. Barlow, 693 F.2d 954, 962 (6th Cir. 1982Xthe motive, or
lack thereof, to injure the accused is a factor affecting trustworthiness); State v. Myatt, 237
Kan. 17, -, 697 P.2d 836, 842 (1985Xthe nature and duration of the sexual contact, as well
as the description of a sexual act beyond a child's normal experience, are factors affecting
trustworthiness).
157. See N.D.R. EvID. 803 (admitting as substantive evidence statements falling within
accepted exceptions to the hearsay rule).
158. Twenty-three states have adopted, by statute or rule, hearsay exceptions for
statements by children in sexual abuse cases: ALASKA STAT. § 12.40.110 (Supp. 1988); ARIz.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1416 (Supp. 1988); ARK. R. EVID. 803 (25XAX1985); CAL. EVID. CODE
§ 1228 (West Supp. 1989); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-25-129 (1987); FLA. STAT. § 90.803(23)
(West Supp. 1989); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, 1 115-10 (Smith-Hurd 1984); IND. CODE ANN.
§ 35-37-4-6 (Burns Supp. 1989); IOWA CODE § 232.96(6) (1985); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60460(dd) (1983 & Supp. 1988); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1205 (Supp. 1988); MD. CTS. &
JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 9-103.1 (1989); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.02(3) (West 1988); Mo.
REV. STAT. § 491.075 (Vernon Supp. 1989); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 65.00-30 (McKinney
1985); N.D.R. EvID. 803(24) (1990); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2803.1 (West Supp. 1989);
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 14-1-69 (Supp. 1988); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 19-16-38 (1987); TEX.
CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 38.072 (Vernon Supp. 1989); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-411
(1990); VT. R. EvID. 804a (Supp. 1988); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.120 (1988).
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STATEMENTS FOR PURPOSES OF MEDICAL DIAGNOSIS OR
TREATMENT

Under the rules of evidence, admissible are "(s)tatements
made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or general character of the cause or external
source thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or
treatment."' 159
The medical examination after abuse serves several purposes,
such as to ascertain if there is any medical evidence consistent
with abuse; to determine what, if any treatment is needed; and to
assure the child that she is physically okay. 16° The trend of authority is to admit statements identifying the perpetrator in child sexual abuse prosecutions. 16 Even if the statement identifying the
perpetrator is made by the child while a nurse or social worker is
recording the child's history, outside the presence of the physician,
the statement is not necessarily rendered inadmissible
under the
16 2
medical diagnosis and treatment hearsay exception.
Statements by the child to the physician, if relevant to diagno159. FED. R. EVID. 803(4); N.D.R. EVID. 803(4). The underlying rationale for the
exception is the assumption that such statements are reliable because the declarant knows
that proper medical care depends on telling the truth. United States v. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d
77, 83-84 (8th Cir. 1980).
160. Moore, The Medical Diagnosisand Treatment Exception to Hearsay-The Use of
the Child Protection Team in Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions, 13 N. KY. L. REV. 51, 55-56
(1986). A physician needs to know the type of object and the area of contact in order to
take appropriate swabs and samples for venereal disease. Id. Even in cases where the
abuse does not involve penetration, a physician cannot treat infection unless the physician
knows where on the victim's body contact occurred and the type of object that contacted
the victim. Id.
Questions about who inappropriately touched the child are arguably relevant because
abuse by a parent or caretaker may be more chronic and the medical findings different than
with an isolated instance of abuse. Because pediatricians generally take a holistic approach
to a child's health, a complete medical history is also relevant so that children may be
referred to a counselor. See Moore, supra at 55-56.
161. Graham, supra note 119, at 529. See also United States v. Renville, 779 F.2d 430,
436-37 (8th Cir. 1985X"[S]tatement by a child abuse victim that the abuser is a member of
the victim's immediate household ... are reasonably pertinent to treatment.... The exact
nature and extent of the psychological problems which ensue from child abuse often
depend on the identity of the abuser."Xemphasis in original); People v. Wilkins, 134 Mich.
App. 38, _ 349 N.W.2d 815, 817-18 (1984Xupholding the admission of a sexually abused
child's statement to her doctor identifying the child's stepfather as the perpetrator);
Goldade v. State, 674 P.2d 721, 726 (Wyo. 1983) cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1253 (1984) ("[fi]t is
apparent from the testimony of the physician... that he was involved in attempting to
diagnose and, if diagnosed, to then treat child abuse, not simply bruises on the little girl's
face. The identity of the person causing those injuries is a pertinent fact in these
circumstances.")
162. United States v. DeNoyer, 811 F.2d 436, 438-39 (8th Cir. 1987). However, a
foundation for the statement must be laid by establishing that it is the physician's practice
to have the staff take the child's history and that the physician uses the history for purposes
of medical diagnosis and treatment. Id. The court in DeNoyer extended the residual
exception to a child's out-of-court statement made to a social worker. Id.
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sis or treatment, are admissible as substantive evidence at trial.16 3
C.

STATEMENTS HAVING CIRCUMSTANTIAL GUARANTEES
OF TRUSTWORTHINESS

Both federal and state rules of evidence permit the introduction of a statement not specifically covered by the first 23 exceptions to Rule 803, so long as the statement has "equivalent
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness."' 6 4 Additionally,
before such a statement is admissible, the court must determine
that "the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact," "is
more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other
evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable
efforts," and "the general purposes of these rules and the interests
of justice will best be served by admission of the statement into
evidence."'" The proponent of the statement must provide fair
notice to the opposing party.' s Courts generally enforce the
notice requirement before trial but have admitted
such state6
ments if the need for admission arises during trial.' 1
The most significant requirement of this residual exception to
the hearsay rule is that the statement must possess "circumstantial
guarantees of trustworthiness" equivalent to those of statements
admitted under one of the traditional exceptions. 168 Courts should
determine trustworthiness on a case-by-case basis, considering
such factors as the child's age; the child's physical and mental condition; the circumstances of the alleged event; the language used
by the child; 16 9 the presence of corroborative physical evidence;
163. See FED. R. EvID. 803(4); N.D.R. EVID. 803(4). See supra note 144 for the text of
N.D.R. Evid. 803(4).
164. FED. R. EVID. 803(24); N.D.R. EVID. 803(25). See supra note 146 for the text of
N.D.R. Evid. 803(25). N.D.R. Evid. 803(25) was formerly Rule 803(24) and was amended
effective March 1, 1990.
165. Id.
166. Id. The failure to provide notice has not been a recurring justification for
exclusion. See Yasser, StrangulatingHearsay: The Residual Exceptions to the Hearsay Rule,
11 TEx. TEcH. L. REv. 587, 595 (1980).
167. See generally Yasser, supra note 166, at 595-97, 601-03; United States v. Bailey,
581 F.2d 341, 348 (2d Cir. 1978); State v. Gremillion, 542 So.2d 1074, 1078 (La. 1989).
168. See Graham, supra note 119, at 531 (statements must possess "circumstantial
gurantees of trustiworthiness" to be admissible).
169. Testifying in favor of the Washington hearsay statute, Mary Kay Barbieri, chief of
the criminal division of the King County Prosecutor's Office and co-author of the statute,
explained the need to admit hearsay statements of child victims of sexual abuse. Joint
Hearings on S.4461 Before the Washington State Senate Judiciary Comm. and the House
Ethics, Law & Justice Comm., 47th Leg., 23d Sess. 8-9 (1982)[hereinafter Joint
Hearings](statement of Mary Kay Barbieri, chief of the Criminal Division of the King
County Prosecutor's Office). In her testimony, Barbieri drew from the facts of State v.
Johnson, 96 Wash. 2d 926, -, 639 P.2d 1332, 1333 (1982):
Dad's making spaghetti, just minding his own business cooking; and his little girl
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the relationship of the accused to the child; the child's family,
school, and peer relationships; and any motive to falsify or distort
the event.

170

Because of its flexibility, the residual exception to the hearsay
rule is superior to the judicial approaches to child hearsay statements embodied in the excited utterance and medical diagnosis
exceptions above-described. Moreover, unlike the excited utterance exception, the residual exception allows a court to examine
indicia of reliability other than spontaneity, which by itself7 does
not specifically address the nature of child sex abuse cases.1 '
V. MISCELLANEOUS METHODS OF INTRODUCING OUTOF-COURT STATEMENTS BY CHILDREN IN
SEXUAL ABUSE CASES
In a relatively small number of cases, out-of-court statements
by children about sexual abuse have been introduced as present
sense impressions; 7 ' then existing mental, emotional, or physical
conditions;17 3 former testimony; 1 74 and prior statements by witsays, "Does milk come out of your penis, Dad?" Dad says no; and the little girl
says, "'It comes out of Melody's dad's penis and tastes yukky." When (the little
girl) comes to court, she doesn't say graphic things like that. She's scared. She
sits there, and the prosecutor, who's trying to be nice, says..."Did Melody's dad
do something to you didn't like?" and she goes, nodding. "What did he do?" Long, painful silence - maybe the prosecutor shows a doll and says, "Can you
point on this doll to what it was?" How does that look to the jury? It looks like
there's a little girl who's coached or making it up or doesn't know what she's
talking about. But if the jury also hears the statement that the little kid made
while Dad was cooking spaghetti, can't we all agree that that statement was
more reliable and better evidence about what happened(?)
Joint Hearings, supra.
170. State v. Myatt, 237 Kan. 17, _ 697 P.2d 836, 843 (1985).
171. See Yun, A Comprehensive Approach To Child Hearsay Statements in Sex Abuse
Cases, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1745, 1762 (1983Xanalysis of traditional hearsay exceptions and
their unsuitability to address the statements of children about sexual abuse).
172. FED. R. EVID. 803(1); N.D.R. EvID. 803(1). FED. R. EVID. 803(1) provides: "The
following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available as a
witness: (1) PRESENT SENSE IMPRESSION. A statement describing or explaining an event or
condition made while the declarant was perceiving the event or condition, or immediately
thereafter." FED. R. EVID. 803(1).
173. FED. R. EVID. 803(3); N.D.R. EVID. 803(3). FED. R. EVID. 803(3) provides:
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is
available

as a witness: . . . (3) THEN EXISTING MENTAL, EMOTIONAL, OR

PHYSICAL CONDITION. A statement of the declarant's then existing state of
mind, emotion, sensation, or physical condition (such as intent, plan, motive,
design, mental feeling, pain, and bodily health), but not including a statement of
memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed unless it relates to
the execution, revocation, identification, or terms of declarant's will.
FED. R. EVID. 803(1).
174. FED. R. EVID. 804(bXl); N.D.R. EVID.804(bXl). FED. R. EVID. 804(bXl) provides:
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable
as a witness: (1) FORMER TESTIMONY. Testimony given as a witness at another
hearing of the same or a different proceeding, or in a deposition taken in
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ness as non-hearsay. 1 7 5
In addition, at least twenty-six states have enacted videotaping statutes, many enacted within the past six years. 1 76 These statutes provide for the admission of a child's videotaped statement 1as
77
evidence in sexual abuse cases if certain conditions are met.
For example, in order to survive challenges based upon lack of
confrontation, it is likely that cross-examination of the child must
be allowed during videotaping or at trial. 1 78 While North Dakota
has no statute or special rule addressing such videotaped statements, trial courts in at least two judicial districts of the state have
17 9
permitted the introduction of such statements at trial.
Expert testimony as to typical behavior patterns of victims of
sexual abuse is generally held admissible, especially when the victim reacted in a manner unlike that which a community would
compliance with law in the course of the same or another proceeding, if the
party against whom the testimony is now offered, or, in a civil action or
proceeding, a predecessor in interest, had an opportunity and similar motive to
develop the testimony by direct, cross, or redirect examination.
FED. R. EviD. 804(bX1).
175. FED. R. EVID. 801(dXl); N.D.R. EVID. 801(dXl). This rule provides that a
statement is not hearsay if the declarant "testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to

cross-examination concerning the statement, and the statement [is consistent with the
declarant's testimony and]... is offered to rebut an express or implied charge against the
declarant of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive." Id. In many child sexual
abuse cases, the focus of cross-examination is on the improper influence of a parent upon
the child and/or the possibility of fabrication by the child. Once reference is made to
improper influence, assuming the child testifies and is subject to cross-examination
concerning the out-of-court statement, the statement is admissible as substantive evidence.
176. ALA. CODE § 15-25-2 (Supp. 1988); ALASKA STAT. § 12.45.047 (1984); ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 13-4253 (1985); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 43-2035 to -2037 (1985); CAL. PENAL

CODE § 1346 (West 1985); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-413 (1986); Act of July 8, 1985, Pub. Act.
No. 85-587, 1985 Conn. Legis. Serv. 463 (West); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 3511 (1987); FLA.
STAT. § 92-53 (1989); IOWA CODE ANN. § 910.A3 (West Supp. 1985); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 223434 (1988); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421.350 (Baldwin Supp. 1989); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.

ch. 278, § 16D (West 1985); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 491.680 to .687 (Vernon Supp. 1989); MONT.
CODE ANN. §§ 46-15-401 to -403 (1987); NEv. REV. STAT. ANN. § 174.229 (Michie 1986);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 517:13-a (1988); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-17 (1984); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 22,§ 753 (West 1984); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-37-13.1 (1988); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
ANN. § 23A-12-9 (1985); TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-7-116 (1988); TEx. CriM. PROC. CODE ANN.

art. 38.071 (Vernon 1989); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-35-15.5 (1989); VT. R. EVID. 807 (Supp.
1988); Wis. STAT. § 967.04(7) (1988).
177. Note, The Testimony of Child Victims in Sex Abuse Prosecutions: Two Legislative
Innovations, 98 HARV. L. REV. 806, 814 (1985) [hereinafter Testimony of Child Victims].
178. Id. Although defendants argue that the admissibility of such testimony is
unconstitutional, many defendants prefer videotaped testimony over live testimony
because videotaped testimony has less impact on the jury. See Ginkowski, The Abused
Child: The Prosecutor's Terrifying Nightmare, 1 CliM. JuST. 30 (1986). The Supreme
Court of Idaho recently addressed the admission of videotaped statements in the case of
Idaho v. Wright, 116 Idaho 382, 775 P.2d 1224 (1989), No. 89-260, cert. granted, 110 S. Ct.
833 (U.S. Jan. 16, 1990XNo. 89-260). See supra note 82 for a discussion on Wright.
179. An informal survey of prosecutors conducted by the authors of this article on
February 1, 1990, revealed that since 1980 district court judges in two of North Dakota's
eight judicial districts, the South Central and Southeast Districts, have accepted into
evidence videotaped statements of children in sexual abuse cases. Prosecutors in the
remaining six judicial districts have not attempted to introduce such videotaped statements.
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commonly expect.1 ° Where the cross-examiner questions the
basis of an expert's opinion, hearsay statements made to the expert
witness by the victim are admissible if the expert relied upon the
statements and the statements are reasonably relied upon by
experts in the field.1 8 '
Finally, eien when the substance of the hearsay statement
may not be admissible under any exception to the hearsay rule,
the fact that the statement was made at all may be introduced
82
under the common law "fresh complaint" theory.1
VI.

NORTH DAKOTA'S NEW EXCEPTION TO THE
HEARSAY RULE: CHILD'S STATEMENT ABOUT
SEXUAL ABUSE

Twenty-three states, including North Dakota, have adopted
by rule or statute a specific exception to the hearsay rule admitting
out-of-court statements by children in sexual abuse cases.18 3 Rule
803(24) of the North Dakota Rules of Evidence provides:
24. CHILD'S STATEMENT ABOUT SEXUAL ABUSE. An
out-of-court statement by a child under the age of 12
years about sexual abuse of that child or witnessed by that
child is admissible as evidence (when not otherwise
admissible under another hearsay exception) if(a) The trial court finds, after hearing upon notice in
advance of the trial of the sexual abuse issue, that the
time, content, and circumstances of the statement provide sufficient guarantess [sic] of trustworthiness; and
(b) The child either:
(i) Testifies at the proceeding; or
(ii) Is unavailable as a witness and there is corroborative evidence of the act which is the act which
is the subject of the statement.
The requirement that the matter of a hearsay statement be
decided before trial prevents prejudice to the defendant'8 4 that
180. See Stout v. State, 528. N.E.2d 476, 479 (Ind. 1988Xpsychiatric social worker
allowed to testify that "there was nothing unusual in the victim's rather factual and
unemotional rendition").
181. State v. Recor, 150 Vt. 40, . 549 A.2d 1382, 1388 (1988).
182. Commonwealth v. Legacy, 23 Mass. App. 622, ...., 504 N.E.2d 674, 678 (1987);
People v. Meacham, 152 Cal. App. 3d 142, _., 199 Cal. Rptr. 586, 596 (1984).
183. See supra note 158 for a list of state rules and statutes regarding hearsay
exceptions in child sex abuse cases.
184. The use of the word "defendant" connotes the context of a criminal case,
however, Rule 803(24) is not limited to criminal cases.
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might otherwise arise from the impact of foundational testimony
heard by the jury.' s 5 The notice requirement is similar to that of
the residual exception' 86 in that the content of the proposed statement must be provided to the opposing party so that he may pre87

pare to contest admission.1

A.

SUFFICIENT GUARANTEES OF TRUSTWORTHINESS

The new North Dakota hearsay rule mandates the court
examine the "time, content, and circumstances of the statement"
in order to determine whether they provide sufficient guarantees
of trustworthiness to permit admission.1se
1. Time
Courts are more likely to admit statements made soon after
the event than those made much later, hence, courts are more
likely to admit initial statements than subsequent statements.' 8 9
Although time and sequence are important, they are not dispositive because delay in reporting and vacillation are commonly associated with complaints of child sexual abuse.190
Children often do not know that what happened to them is
wrong. "For some it represents the first time they experience
what they perceive to be recognition or special attention from the
parent or parent figure."191 Since children may not view the incident of sexual abuse as threatening it is not surprising that they
may not see the need to report it promptly to parents or others in
authority.
Until 1987, by statute in North Dakota, no prosecution for
185. It has been frequently observed that it is impossible to "unring the bell," that is, to
erase from the minds of the jury an impression made by the statement.
186. See N.D.R. EVID. 803(25) and FED. R. EvID. 803(24). See supra note 146 for the
text of North Dakota Rule of Evidence 803(25).
187. Compare N.D.R. EvD. 803(25) and N.D.R. EVID. 803 (24).
188. See N.D.R. EVID. 803(24). In Ohio v. Roberts, the Supreme Court held that
hearsay statements by an unavailable declarant were inadmissible unless the statements
bore adequate "indicia of reliability." Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980). The
proponent of admitting the hearsay can demonstrate reliability by showing either that the
evidence falls within a "firmly rooted" hearsay exception or that it bears "particularized
guarantees of trustworthiness." Id. It is this second prong of the reliability test that is
addressed by the "time, content, and circumstances" language of Rule 803(24) of the North
Dakota Rules of Evidence. As to the first prong, statements of children in sexual abuse cases
have frequently been admitted under traditional or "firmly rooted" exceptions to the
hearsay rule. Id.
189. See FED. R. EvID. 803(1) (present sense impression), 803(2) (excited utterance);
N.D.R. EVID. 803(1), (2).
190. See supra notes 157-169 and accompanying text.
191. MACFARLANE, Sexual Abuse of Children, in THE SEXUAL VICTIMIZATION OF
WOMEN 86, 88-89 (1978).
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child sexual abuse could be instituted unless the alleged offense
was brought to the attention of a public authority within three
months after a parent, guardian, or other competent person specifically interested in the victim learned of the offense.' 92 In the context of a criminal case, a 90-day delay by an adult in reporting an
offense was the maximum allowable.193 In 1987, the 90-day
restriction was removed from the statute.' 94 Arguably, children
should not be held to a stricter punctuality standard than adults in
the reporting of sexual abuse.
2.

Content

In considering the content of the child's statement, courts
examine the exact language used. Approving the admission of a
statement by a seven-year-old, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
ruled, "The childish terminology has the ring of verity and is
' 95
entirely appropriate to a child of his tender years. 11

A court may also consider whether the statement describes an
embarrassing fact that a child would not normally convey unless
true and whether it describes a sexual act-beyond a child's normal
experience. 196

3.

Circumstances

Traditional circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness are
the oath and the opportunity for cross-examination.' 97 In the vast
majority of child sexual abuse cases, these guarantees are
absent.' 98 Accordingly, courts may consider a variety of factors,
loosely described as "circumstances," including: the nature and
duration of the sexual contact, 199 "whether the statement was
made while the child was still upset or in pain because of the incident," ' "whether any event that occurred between the time of
192. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-01(4) (1985).

193. Id.
194. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-01 (Supp. 1989).
195. United States v. Nick, 604 F.2d 1199, 1204 (9th Cir. 1979).
196. State v. Myatt, 237 Kan. 17, _ 697 P.2d 836,843 (1985). See supra note 169 for a
prosecutor's testimony at a legislative hearing regarding admissibility of a child's statement.
197. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63-64 & n.6. See also Wise, The Constitutionality of
Admitting the Videotape Testimony at Trial of Sexually Abused Children, 7 WHIrIER L.

REV. 639, 650 (1985).
198. Id. But see Campbell, LB 90 and the Confrontation Clause: The Use of
Videotaped and In Camera Testimony in CriminalTrials to Accommodate Child Witnesses,
68 NEB. L. REv. 372, 395 (1989) (statutes providing for the use of videotaped statements or
closed-circuit televised testimony typically provide for cross-examination by the accused).
199. Myatt, 237 Kan. at -_ 697 P.2d at 843.
200. Note, Sexual Abuse of Children-Washington's New Hearsay Exception, 58
WASH. L. REv. 813, 827 (1983).
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the alleged act and the time the statement was made could have
accounted for the contents of the statement,"' ° 1 the suggestiveness created by leading questions, 202 whether the child was a
deprived child or a child in need of care, °3 and the reliability of
the testifying victim. 204
B.

CORROBORATIVE EVIDENCE

If the child testifies at the proceeding, and the court has previously determined that the time, content, and circumstances provide sufficient indicia of reliability, the hearsay statement is
admissible under Rule 803(24) of the North Dakota Rules of Evidence. However, if the child is unavailable 0 5 to testify, there
must be corroborative evidence of the act allegedly perpetrated
by the accused. 20
This may be accomplished by physical evidence 20 7 or eyewitness testimony, though these forms of corroboration are rarely possible."° The proponent may also offer admissions or a confession
from the accused, evidence that the accused had the opportunity
to abuse the child, or verification of the child's description of clothing worn by the accused and of personal property at the scene of
the incident as corroborative evidence.2 0o
Psychiatrists may be useful in providing corroborative evidence that a child has been the victim of sexual abuse. 0 While
201. Id.
202. Id. Jurors in Californiav. McMartin, where operators of a preschool charged with
multiple counts of sexual abuse endured the longest criminal trial in state history, acquitted
the defendants and criticized the suggestiveness of the questions put to the alleged victims
by interviewers. N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 1990, at p. 3, col. 5. But see Myatt, 237 Kan. at , 697
P.2d at 841 ("[I]t is highly unlikely that a child will persist in lying to his or her parents, or
other figures of authority about sexual abuse.").
203. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60.460(dd) (1983 & Supp. 1989).
204. See United States v. Nick, 604 F.2d 1199, 1204 (9th Cir. 1979) (mother not likely to
forget her child's simple shocking seven-word statement; mother was also subjected to
cross-examination). Commentators also suggest a need for judicial scrutiny of the
relationship of the child to the accused; the child's family, school, and peer relationships;
the child's age, physical and mental condition; and whether the child has a motive to injure
the accused. Yun, supra note 171, at 1758.
205. See supra notes 116-120 and accompanying text for a discussion of availability.
206. N.D.R. EvID. 803(24). See also Testimony of Child Victims, supra note 177, at
821.
207. Berliner & Barbieri, The Testimony of the Child Victim of Sexual Assault, 40 J.
Soc. ISSuEs, no. 2, at 125, 129 (1984).
208. Id.
209. See Testimony of Child Victims, supra note 177, at 821.
210. Myers, Bays, Becker, Berliner, Corwin & Saywitz, Expert Testimony in Child
Sexual Abuse Litigation, 68 NEB. L. REv. 1, 82-83 (1989). In discussing the utility of expert
testimony in child sexual abuse cases, the authors, who include a social worker, two
psychologists, a pediatrician, a child psychiatrist, and an attorney, state:
[Some court decisions] underestimate the complexity and the degree of
expertise required for evaluation of suspected child sexual abuse. The evaluator

630

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66:599

there is a split of authority over the admissibility at trial of expert
testimony that the child displayed behavioral symptoms of having
been sexually abused,"' such testimony is less objectionable in the
context of the pre-trial hearing contemplated by Rule 803(24) of
the North Dakota Rules of Evidence. 12
Corroboration of the act is not a separate prerequisite to
admissibility when the child testifies in the proceedings, but certain corroborative evidence may be considered by the court in its
examination of the "circumstances" surrounding the child's
statement.21 3
Once the court determines that a child's statement about sexual abuse has the requisite indicia of reliability and the child testifies at the proceeding, the statement is admissible. 14 If the
statement is reliable but the child is unavailable, the child's statement may be admitted under Rule 803(24) if there is sufficient corroboration of the abusive act.215
VI.

CONCLUSION
Because of the dramatic increase in the number of reported

must possess specialized knowledge of child development, individual and family
dynamics, patterns of child sexual victimization, signs and symptoms of abuse,
and the uses and limits of various psychological tests. The competent evaluator
is familiar with the literature on child abuse, and understands the significance of
age-inappropriate sexualization and preoccupation.
The specialized skill and knowledge required for competent evaluation of
suspected child abuse is beyond the ken of most physicians and mental health
professionals. It seems clear that lay jurors are in no position to evaluate
suspected abuse. Properly qualified experts can assist jurors in sifting through
the mountain of complex and sometimes conflicting and counter intuitive
information presented in many child sexual abuse cases.
Id. at 82-83.
211. The following courts have allowed psychiatrists or other experts to testify that
sexual abuse occurred: Seering v. Department of Social Services, 194 Cal. App. 3d 298, 239
Cal. Rptr. 422 (1987); Glendenning v. State, 536 So.2d 212 (Fla. 1988); State v. Kim, 64
Hawaii 598, 645 P.2d 1330 (1982); Townsend v. State, 103 Nev. 113, 734 P.2d 705 (1987);
State v. Middleton, 294 Ore. 427,657 P.2d 1215 (1983); Commonwealth v. Baldwin, 348 Pa.
Super. 368, 502 A.2d 253 (1985).
But see Johnson v. State, 292 Ark. 632, 732 S.W.2d 817 (1987); Russell v. State, 289 Ark.
533, 712 S.W.2d 916 (1986); People v. Roscoe, 168 Cal. App. 3d 1093, 215 Cal. Rptr. 45
(1985); Allison v. State, 256 Ga. 851, 353 S.E.2d 805 (1987); State v. Lamb, 145 Wis. 2d 454,
427 N.W.2d 142 (Ct. App. 1988); State v. Hazeltine, 120 Wis. 2d 92, 352 N.W.2d 673 (Ct.
App. 1984).
212. N.D.R. EVID. 803(24). Courts disallowing expert testimony as to whether sexual
abuse occurred frequently cite rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which calls for
the exclusion of testimony likely to confuse jurors or unduly prejudice a party. At a rule
803(24) pre-trial hearing, no jury is presented and, presumably, the court will be less
susceptible to prejudice than would jurors who have never heard such testimony before.
213. See supra notes 203-210 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
circumstances considered by courts when ruling on the admissibility of children's
statements about sexual abuse.
214. N.D.R. EVID. 803(24).
215. Id.

1990]

APPLICATION OF THE HEARSAY'EXCEPTIONS

631

cases of child sexual abuse, state courts and legislatures will likely
continue to experiment with methods of protecting society's most
vulnerable citizens. Adoption of an exception to the hearsay rule,
as was done recently in North Dakota,216 is but one of many
approaches taken to address the issue. However, these approaches
must be carefully tailored so as not to infringe upon the accused's
right of confrontation protected by the sixth amendment and state
statute. 17 Rule 803(24) of the North Dakota Rules of Evidence
will likely survive constitutional scrutiny because it predicates
admissibility of a child's hearsay statement upon a finding that the
statement is sufficiently trustworthy and requires that the child
testify if available.

216. N.D.R. EVID. 803(24).
217. See supra note 13-35 and accompanying text for a discussion of the confrontation
clause.

